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Abstract
This memorandum is a redacted version of a confidential research paper on export restriction negotiations 
in relation to food security under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The complete 
version of this paper has two components: the first provides a sketch of the existing legal framework and 
negotiation proposals on export restriction; the second provides negotiation proposals. Due to confidentiality 
considerations, only the first component of analysis is publicly available and presented here. This memorandum 
is organized into three parts. The first part elaborates on the most relevant WTO treaties, namely the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). It discusses how 
ambiguity in the terms in these treaties poses challenges to effective regulation of export restriction. The 
second part presents proposals from several WTO Members that seek to clarify the ambiguities or fill the void 
in the existing regulatory schemes. The third part discusses regional trade treaties, including Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TTP), along with other less prominent WTO agreements.
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ملخ�ص
هذه املذكرة هي ن�شخة منقحة عن ورقة بحثية �شرية حول القيود املفرو�شة على املفاو�شات ذات ال�شلة بالأمن الغذائي 
حتت رعاية منظمة التجارة العاملية (WTO(. تتاألف الن�شخة الكاملة لهذه الورقة من عن�شرين: مينح العن�شر الأول 
خطة لالإطار القانوين القائم ومقرتحات التفاو�ض على قيود ال�شادرات. اأما العن�شر الثاين، فهو مينح مقرتحات 
التفاو�ض. وب�شبب ال�شرية، اإن العن�شر الأول فقط متاح للعامة و�شيتم عر�شه يف هذه املذكرة. تتمحور هذه املذكرة 
حول ثالثة اأق�شام حيث يتناول الق�شم الأول اأهم معاهدات منظمة التجارة العاملية (WTO(، وبالأخ�ض التفاقية 
العامة للتعرفة والتجارة الدولية GATT 1994) 1994( واتفاقية الزراعة (AoA(. كما اأنه يناق�ض كيف ي�شهم التبا�ض 
امل�شطلحات يف هذه املعاهدات يف خلق التحديات على �شعيد التنظيم الفعال لقيود ال�شادرات. اأما الق�شم الثاين، 
فهو يعر�ض املقرتحات العديدة لأع�شاء منظمة التجارة العاملية (WTO( والتي تهدف اإىل تو�شيح اللتبا�شات اأو ملء 
الثغرات يف املخططات التنظيمية القائمة. ويناق�ض الق�شم الثالث املعاهدات التجارية الإقليمية مبا فيها �شراكة التجارة 
وال�شتثمار عرب الأطل�شي (TTIP(، اتفاقية القت�شاد والتجارة ال�شاملة (CETA(، وال�شراكة عرب املحيط الهادئ 
.)WTO( بالإ�شافة اإىل اتفاقيات اأخرى اأقل �شهرة ملنظمة التجارة العاملية ،)TTP)
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I. The WTO Framework:
This section discusses the most relevant WTO Agreements in relation to food security: GATT 19941 and AoA.2
GATT Article XI
Article XI of GATT 1994 prohibits the application of quantitative restrictions except when they are applied 
temporarily to prevent or relieve a critical shortage. The article provides, in part: 
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective 
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any 
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or 
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting 
party.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following: 
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of 
foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party.3
With respect to paragraph 1, the phrase “prohibitions or restrictions” is used in a very broad manner, 
and it is understood to refer to a “legal ban on the trade or importation of a specified commodity”. 
In Colombia–Ports of Entry, the panel concluded that the term “restrictions” refers to “measures that 
create uncertainties and affect investment plans, restrict market access for imports, or make importation 
prohibitively costly.”4 The panel in India–Quantitative Restrictions concluded that the term “restrictions” is 
“broad”, and in terms of its ordinary meaning, is “a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation.”5 
Paragraph 2 of GATT Article XI is an exception that allows for the use of any export restrictions under 
limited circumstances for a limited time. Paragraph 2 also contains many undefined and ambiguous terms. 
Therefore, it may lead exporting countries to use different interpretations of the same word, depending 
on the interpretations that best suit the interpreters. The discussion below will point out some ambiguous 
terms. 
“Temporarily”
The treaty does not delineate the period that can be counted as “temporarily”. Subsequently, in China—
Raw Materials, China claimed that the term “temporarily” should be counted in relation to the duration 
required to relieve the critical shortage: “China submits that the time period will be defined in relation to 
the time required to prevent or relieve the critical shortage.”6 On the other hand, both of the complainants 
(the United States and the European Union) and third parties (Brazil and Canada) argued that a temporary 
measure must have an expiry date. To support their argument, Brazil defined the term “temporarily 
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 14 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. GATT 1994 consists of a number of documents and agreements. For a list of its 
constituent parts and explanatory notes, see https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm. 
2 Agreement on Agriculture, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
410, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm [hereinafter AoA]. 
3 GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XI, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_05_e.htm.
4 Panel Report, Colombia–Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WTO Doc. WT/DS366/R (adopted 27 April 2009), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=75079,74367&CurrentCatalogueId
Index=1&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True, cited in Panel Report, Measures 




5 India–Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/R (adopted 6 
April 1999), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=22369&Current 
CatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True, cited in China–Raw 
Materials, supra note 4, VII.206.
6 China–Raw Materials, supra note 4, VII.251.
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applied” as “lasting or meant to last for a limited time only; not permanent; made or arranged to supply 
a passing need.”7 Furthermore, in this case, the panel defined “temporarily” as “for a time (only)” and 
“during a limited time.”8 The term “limited time” means “appointed, fixed” and “circumscribed within 
definite limits, bounded, restricted.”9
“Critical shortage”
In addition, the article states that “the restriction is applied temporarily to prevent or relieve critical 
shortage” without specifying the amount or percentage of the shortage of food that could be considered 
a critical shortage. Moreover, the article does not differentiate between an actual and a potential critical 
shortage, creating an area of ambiguity that came up in the China-Raw Materials case. One side can argue 
that the phrase “critical shortage” refers to a preventive action that should occur before the critical 
shortage and, if that interpretation is correct, raise the question of what signs will allow preventive 
measures. The other side can argue that the more-inclusive phrase “relieve critical shortage” indicates 
that the shortage must have already occurred before restrictions can follow. In the China-Raw Materials 
case, both sides raised these arguments in accordance with their interests. The panel settled the conflict 
by determining that the term “critical” indicates that a shortage must be of “decisive importance” or 
“grave”, or even rising to the level of a “crisis” or catastrophe. Article XI: 2(a) states that measures in the 
form of restrictions or bans may be used on a temporary basis to either outright “prevent” or otherwise 
“relieve” such a shortage.10 
“Essential”
Likewise, “essential” is not well-defined. China, in the China-Raw Materials dispute, considered that for 
a product to be essential, it must be “material, important or requisite for the exporting Member.”11 In 
addition, China submitted that Article XI:2(a) does not limit the types of “other products” that may be 
subject to restrictions, except that the products must be “‘essential’ to the exporting Member.”12 The 
opposing parties contended that such a broad approach “ignores the fact that the term ‘essential’ serves 
to limit the scope of ‘products.’”13 However, the panel interpretation was broad and did not resolve the 
disagreement, which further demonstrates that the article is not well-defined.14
In conclusion, thus far, most of the terms of the provision have been interpreted in only one dispute, 
leaving inadequate guidance as to how these terms should be applied to a food security situation. 
GATT Article XX
GATT Article XX allows WTO Members to be relieved of their obligations under the GATT under a list 
of justifications, including matters involving public morals, health, prison labor, and national historic/
cultural treasures.15 “Such measures cannot constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”16 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
7 China–Raw Materials, supra note 4, VII.254.
8 Id. VII.255.





14 See Id. 273-82.
15 GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XX, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm#article20 
[hereinafter Article XX].
16 WTO ECampus, Exceptions to WTO Rules: General Exceptions, Security Exceptions, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), Balance-of-
Payments (BOPs) & Waivers, Introduction (n.d.), https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_382/Module_537/ModuleDocuments/
eWTO-M8-R1-E.pdf (last visited 16 January 2018).
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means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
. . .
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such 
materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is 
held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions 
shall not operate to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic industry, and 
shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination;
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; Provided that 
any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an 
equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that any such measures, which are 
inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions 
giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the need for this 
subparagraph not later than 30 June 1960.17
A number of questions could be raised about the application of this article. In light of the prohibition 
of departure from the provisions relating to non-discrimination at the end of sub-paragraph (i), what if 
a country wanted to export its internal materials and increase the price for the benefit of its income? 
Sub-paragraph (j) suggests that the meaning of “equitable” refers to any given circumstance in which 
the WTO Member diverts an excessive share of its supply to individual countries and will be contrary to 
the principle of equitable distribution. In that light, what if the contracting parties had a dispute about 
the shares of the international supply for such product? Is there a limit that the WTO states are obliged 
to not exceed in order to limit the share of each country? In addition, does the reference to “general or 
local short supply” in sub-paragraph (j) apply to cases where a product, although in the international short 
supply, is not necessarily in short supply in all markets throughout the world? Also, the language does not 
appear to be used in the sense that every country that is importing a commodity is in short supply. This 
would require the contracting parties to have some flexibility to take trade restrictive action when a 
certain product becomes temporarily scarce. Even if those who have the flexibility take restrictive action, 
will it not affect the others? Further, the flexibility in this situation is constrained by the requirement 
imposed to respect the principle of equitable shares for the members. 
GATT Article XXI 
Article XXI includes Security Exceptions that allow a contracting party to take measures to protect its 
security interests.18 
Article XXI
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary 
to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection 
of its essential security interests
. . .
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; 
or . . . 19
17 Article XX, supra note 15, sub-paras. (i)-(j).
18 GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XXI, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf.
19 Id. sub-para. (a) & (b)(iii). 
50
Importantly, Article XXI does not define “essential security interests”. When the “US notified the contracting 
parties of an Executive Order 12513 of May 1, 1985, that is prohibiting all imports of goods and services 
of Nicaraguan origin and all exports from the US of goods to or destined for Nicaragua. Nicaragua stated 
that the text of Article XXI made it clear that the contracting parties were competent to judge whether 
a situation of  war or other emergency in international relations  existed and requested that a panel is 
set up under Article XXIII:2 to examine the issue. The United States stated that its actions had been taken 
for national security reasons and were covered by Article XXI:(b)(iii) of the GATT and that this provision 
left it to each contracting party to judge what action it considered necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interest. The panel stated that, the dispute agreed upon both parties in the United 
States had acted contrary to certain trade-facilitating provisions of the General Agreement but was 
disagreed on the question of whether the non-observance of these provisions was justified by Article XXI(b)
(iii). Therefore, the panel did not consider the question of whether the terms of Article XXI precluded it 
from examining the validity of the United States’ invocation of that Article. It concluded that as it was 
not authorized to examine the justification, it could find that the United States neither to be complying 
with its obligations under the General Agreement nor to be failing to carry out its obligations under that 
Agreement. The panel further noted that, in the view of Nicaragua, this provision should be interpreted 
in the light of the basic principles of international law and in harmony with the decisions of the United 
Nations and of the International Court of Justice and should, therefore, be regarded as merely providing 
contracting parties subjected to an aggression with the right of self-defense. The panel also noted that, 
in the view of the United States, Article XXI applied to any action which the contracting party taking it 
considered necessary for the protection of its essential security interests and that the panel, both by the 
terms of Article XXI and by its mandate, was precluded from examining the validity of the United States’ 
invocation of Article XXI.”20 
Furthermore, the self-judging nature of the provision of section (b) could lead to an arbitrary decision. 
The United States embargo on trade with Cuba, which was imposed by means of Proclamation 3447 by 
the President of the United States, dated 3 February 1962,21 was not formally raised by the contracting 
parties but notified by Cuba in the inventory of non-tariff measures. The United States invoked GATT 
Article XXI as justification for its action. Also, section b:(i), mentioned “relating to ‘fissionable materials’ 
or the materials from which they are derived.”22 
Criteria are needed to clarify the meaning.
AoA Article 12
This article lists the procedures that should be applied when a country intends to apply the exception in 
GATT Article XI(2)(a) that allows applying restrictions on exportation. According to the WTO,
In principle, all WTO agreements and understandings on trade in goods apply to agriculture, including 
the GATT 1994 and WTO agreements on such matters as customs valuation, import licensing procedures, 
pre-shipment inspection, emergency safeguard measures, subsidies, and technical barriers to trade. 
However, where there is any conflict between these agreements and the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture prevail.23 
20 World Trade Organization, Analytical Index of the GATT, Section II: Interpretation and Application of Article XXI, 601, 603-04 
(n.d.), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf (last visited 21 January 2018) [hereinafter GATT 
Analytical Index].
21 John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Proclamation 3447–Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, The American Presidency 
Project (3 February 1962) (US Presidential document archive project, U.C. Santa Barbara, Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, 
Archivists), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58824.
22 GATT Analytical Index, supra note 20, at 605. 
23 World Trade Organization, Agriculture: Explanation, Introduction, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro01_
intro_e.htm (last visited 21 January 2018).
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The text of Article 12 is as follows:
1. Where any Member institutes any new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs in accordance 
with paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of GATT 1994, the Member shall observe the following provisions:
(a)  The Member instituting the export prohibition or restriction shall give due consideration to the 
effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing member food security. 
(b)  Before any Member institutes an export prohibition or restriction, it shall give notice in writing, 
as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on Agriculture comprising such information 
as the nature and the duration of such measure, and shall consult, upon request, with any other 
Member having a substantial interest as an importer with respect to any matter related to the 
measure in question. The Member instituting such export prohibition or restriction shall provide, 
upon request, such a Member with necessary information.
2. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any developing country Member unless the measure is 
taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food exporter of the specific foodstuff concerned.24
Paragraph 1 of this article does not clarify the relevant consideration. In addition, the article states that 
“it shall give notice in writing”, which obligates the Member instituting export restriction to produce 
written notice. Nevertheless, the article does not specify a detailed period for such a notice, necessary 
information to be included in the notice, or actions that could be taken if the importing Member disapproves 
the request. “The group of ‘net food-importing developing countries’ is well defined in the WTO legal 
context, but no such definition exists for the “net-food exporting developing countries” mentioned in 
Paragraph 2 of AoA Article 12.”25
In conclusion, both the GATT and AoA, the most relevant agreements in relation to export restrictions, 
contain ambiguous terms and incomplete descriptions of obligations, which constrains the effectiveness of 
the existing WTO framework. As Qatar is a net food-importing country, the ambiguities in these provisions 
are disadvantageous to Qatar.  
II. Proposals
In this part of our memorandum, we will examine a number of proposals that suggest amending or revising 
some of the provisions of relevant WTO agreements. They were proposed by Switzerland, Cairns Group, 
Jordan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan. 
Switzerland 
Switzerland submitted its opening ideas concerning the directions governed by Article 20 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.26 Switzerland offered a number of dicta relating to this agreement. Regarding export 
restrictions, “Switzerland propose[d] the elimination of all export restrictions on agricultural products 
and the binding at zero of all export tariffs.”27 Additionally, Switzerland suggested that tariffs “should 
be negotiated on a product-by-product and case-by-case basis in the framework of an application/offer 
procedure supplemented, where appropriate, by a tariff reduction formula.”28 
24 AoA, supra note 2, art. 12, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_02_e.htm#articleXII.
25 Giovanni Anania, Agricultural Export Restrictions and the WTO: What Options do Policy-Makers Have for promoting Fod Security? 
16 (Int’l Ctr. For Trade and Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 50, November 2013), https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/11/
agricultural-export-restrictions-and-the-wto-what-options-do-policy-makers.pdf.
26 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, WTO: Negotiations on Agriculture-Proposal by Switzerland, 
WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/94 (21 December 2000).
27 Id. § 6.4.
28 Id. § 7(4).
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The Republic of Korea 
The proposal submitted by Korea was a result of its concern on the food security of the country as a net-
food importing country. Its proposal advocated “that the Uruguay Round was not successful in reflecting 
in a balanced manner the interests of both developed and developing countries, as well as exporting and 
importing countries . . . and that the food security situation of developing countries is still unstable.”29 
Moreover, Korea proposed to strengthen the disciplines in the following areas: “to prohibit exporting 
countries from imposing export restrictions and prohibitions arbitrarily; to prohibit the use of export tax 
for the purpose of export restriction; to secure transparency in the operation of state trading enterprises 
and to prevent their circumventing of reduction commitment in export subsidy.” 30
The Democratic Republic of the Congo
The proposal of the Democratic Republic of the Congo31 only stated the issues that they thought needed 
to be considered. Regarding export subsidies, Congo emphasized the need for the elimination of export 
subsidies of all types; “an initial reduction by 60 per cent of the final Uruguay Round commitments”; the 
need for food aid, without attached trade conditions, to developing countries, and the need to abolish 
export taxes.32
Jordan
In the Jordanian proposal of the negotiation process that began in March 2000,33 Jordan stated that it 
“follow[ed] a strict economic adjustment leading to internal and external trade liberalization” and that 
its “average bound tariff” was thirty percent.34 In comparison to the other trading partner countries, 
Jordan proposed abolishing “all forms of export subsidies” and that such “should be bound to zero rates.”35 
Cairns Group 
“With a view toward providing increased certainty of supply for food importing countries and a particular 
focus on the least developed and developing net-food importing countries,” 36 the Cairns Group “proposed 
improved disciplines on export restrictions and taxes and eliminate tariff escalation, preserve Article 12.2 
of the Agreement on Agriculture, and provide additional special and differential treatment provisions 
to address the legitimate needs of developing countries, including the least developed and net-food 
importing developing countries.”37
The United States 
The United States submitted its proposal “[i]n accordance with the long-term objective of establishing 
a fairer, more market-oriented agricultural trading system and procedures agreed at the March meeting 
of the Committee on Agriculture.”38
29 World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Proposal for WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Submitted 
by the Republic of Korea, Introduction § 2, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/98 (9 January 2001),  https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/
FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=898,14989,6198,694,66169,62719,48712,46973,44957,3145&Curren
tCatalogueIdIndex=8&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
30 Id. § B(c)(25).
31 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Negotiating Proposals by the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/135 (12 March 2001), file:///D:/Downloads/NGW135.pdf.
32 Id. § 3.
33 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, WTO Agriculture Negotiations: Proposal by Jordan, 
WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/140 (22 March 2001), file:///D:/Downloads/NGW140.pdf.
34 Id. § 1 (Introduction).
35 Id. § 2.2.
36 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, WTO Negotiations on Agriculture-Cairns Group 
Negotiating Proposal: Export Restrictions and Taxes, 1, WTO Doc. G/Ag/NG/W93* (21 December 2000), https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd02_props1_e.htm (follow link to G/AG/NG/W/93*).
37 Id. at 1.
38 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural 
Trade Reform, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15 (23 June 2000), file:///D:/Downloads/NGW15.pdf.
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The proposal summarized a two-phase process for trade reform. The first phase eliminates export subsidies 
and reduces worldwide tariffs and trade-distorting domestic support over a 5-year period. This would 
be accomplished by harmonizing tariffs and trade-distorting domestic support at substantially lower 
levels than what is currently allowed. The second phase is the eventual elimination of all tariffs and 
trade-distorting support by a specific date to be established in these negotiations. The United States 
proposed “to strengthen substantially WTO disciplines on export restrictions to increase the reliability 
of global food supply”39 and “to prohibit the use of export taxes, including differential export taxes, for 
competitive advantage or supply management purposes.”40 
Japan 
Japan’s negotiating proposal was based upon the fundamental philosophy of coexistence of agriculture.41 
Japan reported itself as “actively engaged in the agricultural negotiations in accordance with Article 20 
of the AoA.”42 Its proposal incorporated views and comments from a wide range of the society, “including 
not only agricultural producers but also the consumers themselves.”43 More specifically, Japan proposed 
the following:  
4.2 Export prohibitions/restrictions, export taxes
(a) Ensuring food security for its population is an important responsibility of each government. Export 
prohibitions and restrictions, which an exporting country will take temporarily, can severely affect 
the food security of an importing country, even if it can be considered a necessary measure for 
the exporting country in view of ensuring its own food security. 
(b) With regard to imports, all border measures, other than tariffs, have been replaced by tariffs 
in principle. On the other hand, Members can freely take export prohibitions and restriction 
measures under the current Agreement. Japan thus proposes that all export prohibitions and 
restrictions be tariffed (i.e. replaced by the export taxes).
(c) All import tariffs are bound and commitment has been made to reduce them under the current 
Agreement, even though there exists no provision concerning export taxes. It is necessary, 
therefore, to bind the level of all export taxes, including those possibly introduced in the future. 
With regard to products subject to the export tax, it is also necessary to establish quotas in which 
exports equivalent to a certain proportion of domestic production will be exempt from the export 
tax. Disciplines in this regard should be defined.
(d) Furthermore, clarification of the disciplines on export restrictions is necessary in order to prepare 
for a situation where an exporting country, if export taxes have not been introduced, faces an 
urgent need to restrict exports.44
Japan proposed that all export prohibitions and restrictions should be tariffed (i.e. replaced by the 
export taxes). Also, export rules and disciplines should be strengthened, since it is necessary to ensure 
the stability and predictability of exports in order to ensure food security in importing countries. Export 
state trading could affect the entire international market of a specific agricultural product, as well as 
the food security of importing countries. Therefore, disciplines on export state trading should be clarified 
in order to improve its transparency and predictability.
39 Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform, Supra note 38, at 6. 
40 Id. at 3.
41 World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural 
Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91 (21 December 2000). The text can be found at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 







(i) Regional Trade Agreements
The paper will now discuss the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as well as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canada-Chile free trade agreement, and the Canada-
Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement.
TTIP (In Progress)
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement is being negotiated between 
the United States and the European Union. TTIP negotiations began in June 201345 and are currently 
taking place behind closed doors. In relation to food security, the European Union’s proposal for legal 
text on “Agriculture” in TTIP was made public on 21 March 2016.46 It stated, in part:
Cooperation in Multilateral and other Fora
. . .
2. The Parties recognize the efforts undertaken in international fora to enhance global food security 
and nutrition and sustainable agriculture and commit to actively engage in cooperation in those 
fora. To this end, the Parties shall: 
(a) refrain from undertaking export restrictions as well as the use of export taxes, which might 
exacerbate volatility, increase prices and have a detrimental effect on critical supplies of 
agricultural goods to the Parties and to other trading partners, and seek a coordinated approach 
in the relevant fora.47
. . .
CETA 
CETA, an agreement between the European Union and Canada, seeks to “boost trade, strengthen 
economic relations and create jobs.”48 The provisions relevant to food security state: 
Article 2.6 Duties, taxes or other fees and charges on exports
A Party may not adopt or maintain any duties, taxes or other fees and charges imposed on, or in 
connection with, the export of a good to the other Party, or any internal taxes or fees and charges 
on a good exported to the other Party, that is in excess of those that would be imposed on those 
goods when destined for internal sale.49
Article 2.11 Import and Export Restrictions
1. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, a Party shall not adopt or maintain any prohibition 
or restriction on the importation of any goods of the other Party or on the exportation or sale 
for export of any goods destined for the territory of the other Party, except in accordance with 
Article XI of the GATT 1994. To this end Article XI of the GATT 1994 is incorporated into and 
made a part of this Agreement.
45 See European Commission, Member States endorse EU-US trade and investment negotiations (14 June 2013), http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=918&title=Member-States-endorse-EU-US-trade-and-investment-negotiations.
46 European Union, TTIP-Draft Chapter on Agriculture (21 March 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/
tradoc_154371.pdf.
47 Id. art. X.3(2)(a). 
48 Dominic Webb, CETA: the EU-Canada free trade agreement 5 (House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 7492, 12 September 
2017), file:///D:/Downloads/CBP-7492.pdf; see also: European Commission, The benefits of CETA: The Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154775.
pdf; European Commission, CETA – Summary of the final negotiating results (February 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2014/december/tradoc_152982.pdf. 
49 For the full text, see European Commission, CETA chapter by chapter, art. 2.6, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/
ceta-chapter-by-chapter (last visited 19 January 2018).
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2. If a Party adopts or maintains a prohibition or restriction on the importation from or exportation 
to a third country of a good, that Party may: 
(a) limit or prohibit the importation from the territory of the other Party of a good of that 
third country; or 
(b) limit or prohibit the exportation of a good to that third country through the territory of 
the other Party. 
3. If a Party adopts or maintains a prohibition or restriction on the importation of a good from a 
third country, the Parties, at the request of the other Party, shall enter into discussions with 
a view to avoiding undue interference with or distortion of pricing, marketing or distribution 
arrangements in the other Party. 
4. This Article does not apply to a measure, including that measure’s continuation, prompt renewal 
or amendment, in respect of the following:
(a) the export of logs of all species. If a Party ceases to require export permits for logs destined 
for a third country, that Party will permanently cease requiring export permits for logs 
destined for the other Party;
(b) for a period of three years following the entry into force of this Agreement, the export of 
unprocessed fish pursuant to Newfoundland and Labrador’s applicable legislation; 
(c) Canadian excise duties on absolute alcohol, as listed under tariff item 2207.10.90 in 
Canada’s Schedule of Concessions annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol (Schedule V), used in 
manufacturing under the provisions of the Excise Act, 2001, S.C. 2002, c. 22; and 
(d) the importation of used vehicles into Canada that do not conform to Canada’s safety and 
environmental requirements.50
Under the rules of CETA, all export duties and other export restrictions will be prohibited in 
accordance with Article XI of the GATT. Nevertheless, a Member might request consultations on 
occasions where they feel that their interests are or could be harmfully affected by such a measure 
by the other Party. 
TPP
The TPP is a trade agreement among twelve of the Pacific Rim countries, not including China.51 
Several articles of this agreement are relevant to this topic:
Article 29.2 Security Exceptions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
(a) require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it determines 
to be contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, 
or the protection of its own essential security interests.52 
This article echoes GATT Article XXI with the term “essential security interests”, which allows 
other member to self-judge the scope of the exception. 
50 CETA chapter by chapter, supra note 49, art. 2.11
51 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (October 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-
pacific-partnership [hereinafter, TPP Summary]. For the full text as of the beginning of 2016, see Trans-Pacific Partnership, New 
Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (26 January 2016), https://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text 
[hereinafter TPP Full Text].
52 Id. art. 29.2.
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Article 2.4 Elimination of Customs Duties
1. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, no Party shall increase any existing customs duty, 
or adopt any new customs duty, on an originating good.
. . . 53 
“TPP Parties agree to eliminate and reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers on industrial goods 
and to eliminate or reduce tariffs and other restrictive policies on agricultural goods,”54 which 
will enhance food security. “In addition, they agree not to impose WTO-inconsistent import and 
export restrictions and duties.”55 Furthermore, “if TPP Parties maintain import or export license 
requirements, they will notify each other about the procedures so as to increase transparency 
and facilitate trade flows.”56 
Article 2.10 Import and Export Restrictions
1. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, no Party shall adopt or maintain any prohibition 
or restriction on the importation of any good of another Party or on the exportation or sale for 
export of any good destined for the territory of another Party, except in accordance with Article 
XI of GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes, and to this end Article XI of GATT 1994 and its 
interpretative notes are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis.
. . .57 
According to a summary of the TPP:
To ensure that countries do not maintain or expand other discriminatory trade barriers at the same 
time that they are eliminating tariffs or invent new barriers to circumvent TPP’s obligations; the 
‘Goods Chapter’ incorporates the broad World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations regarding import 
and export restrictions into TPP as the fundamental framework for trade in goods between the Parties. 
In addition, the Goods Chapter prohibits import licensing based on performance requirements, as 
well as prohibiting requirements that exporters establish contractual relationships with domestic 
distributors as a condition of importation. For example, an exporter of U.S. made farm equipment 
cannot be required by law in a TPP party to use a local distributor to import its product into a TPP 
country.58
Article 2.24 Export Restrictions – Food Security 
1. Parties recognize that under Article XI:2(a) of GATT 1994, a Party may temporarily apply an 
export prohibition or restriction that is otherwise prohibited under Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 
on preventing or relieve a critical shortage of foodstuffs, subject to meeting the conditions set 
out in Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
2. In addition to the conditions set out in Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture under which 
a Party may apply an export prohibition or restriction, other than a duty, tax or other charge, 
on foodstuffs: 
(a) a Party that: 
(i) imposes such a prohibition or restriction on the exportation or sale for export of foodstuffs 
to another Party to prevent or relieve a critical shortage of foodstuffs, shall in all cases 
notify the measure to the other Parties prior to the date it takes effect and, except when 
53 TPP Full Text, supra note 51, art. 2.4.
54 TPP Summary, supra note 51, § 2.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 TPP Full Text, supra note 51, art. 2.10(1).
58 AmCham Singapore, Chapter Summaries of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement 15, available through a link from 
AmCham Singapore, TPP Task Force Second Meeting Summary (13 October 2015), http://www.amcham.org.sg/tpp-task-force-
second-meeting-summary.
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the critical shortage is caused by an event constituting force majeure, shall notify the 
measure to the other Parties at least 30 days prior to the date it takes effect; or 
(ii) as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement for that Party, maintains such a 
prohibition or restriction, shall, within 30 days of that date, notify the measure to the 
other Parties. 
(b)  A notification under this paragraph shall include the reasons for imposing or maintaining 
the prohibition or restriction, as well as an explanation of how the measure is consistent 
with Article XI:2(a) of GATT 1994, and shall note alternative measures, if any, that the Party 
considered before imposing the prohibition or restriction. 
(c)  A measure shall not be subject to notification under this paragraph or paragraph 4 if it 
prohibits or restricts the exportation or sale for export only of a foodstuff or foodstuffs of 
which the Party imposing the measure has been a net importer during each of the three 
calendar years preceding the imposition of the measure, excluding the year in which the 
Party imposes the measure. 
(d)  If a Party that adopts or maintains a measure referred to in subparagraph (a) has been a 
net importer of each foodstuff subject to that measure during each of the three calendar 
years preceding imposition of the measure, excluding the year in which the Party imposes 
the measure, and that Party does not provide the other Parties with a notification under 
subparagraph (a), the Party shall, within a reasonable period of time, provide to the other 
Parties trade data demonstrating that it was a net importer of the foodstuff or foodstuffs 
during these three calendar years. 
3. A Party that is required to notify a measure under paragraph 2(a) shall: 
(a) consult, on request, with any other Party having a substantial interest as an importer of the 
foodstuffs subject to the measure, with respect to any matter relating to the measure; 
(b) on the request of any Party having a substantial interest as an importer of the foodstuffs 
subject to the measure, provide that Party with relevant economic indicators bearing on 
whether a critical shortage within the meaning of Article XI:2(a) of GATT 1994 exists or 
is likely to occur in the absence of the measure, and on how the measure will prevent or 
relieve the critical shortage; and 
(c) respond in writing to any question posed by any other Party regarding the measure within 
14 days of receipt of the question. 
4. A Party which considers that another Party should have notified a measure under paragraph 2(a) 
may bring the matter to the attention of that other Party. If the matter is not satisfactorily 
resolved promptly thereafter, the Party which considers that the measure should have been 
notified may itself bring the measure to the attention of the other Parties. 
5. A Party should ordinarily terminate a measure subject to notification under paragraph 2(a) or 
4 within six months of the date it is imposed. A Party contemplating continuation of a measure 
beyond six months from the date it is imposed shall notify the other Parties no later than 
five months after the date the measure is imposed and provide the information specified in 
paragraph 2(b). Unless the Party has consulted with the other Parties that are net importers of 
any foodstuff the exportation of which is prohibited or restricted under the measure, the Party 
shall not continue the measure beyond 12 months from the date it is imposed. The Party shall 
immediately discontinue the measure when the critical shortage, or threat thereof, ceases to 
exist. 
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6. No Party shall apply any measure that is subject to notification under paragraph 2(a) or 4 to 
food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes.59 
The previous article adopted many obligations from GATT Article XI 2(a), with additional clarification. 
Paragraph 5 of the mentioned article limits export restrictions on foodstuffs to six months and 
requires notification of other TPP members in advance. Where a country imposes such restrictions 
and mandates consultation with interested TPP importing countries, the restriction remains in place 
for more than 12 months.60
As this provision is intended to discourage countries from imposing export restrictions on food and 
agricultural products, its implementation is a means of protecting domestic markets from changes 
in the world market. When countries do so with respect to staple food products like rice and wheat, 
poorer countries relying on the international market to import food can suffer damaging restrictive 
access to food. TPP’s commitment in this area will help improve the stability of regional farm markets 
in general and stipulate additional food security to lower-income countries in the region such as 
Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, and Bangladesh.61 
(ii) Other agreements 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
According to McBride and Sergie, NAFTA62
is a three-country accord negotiated by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
that entered into force in January 1994 . . . [It] provided for the elimination of most tariffs on products 
traded among the three countries. Liberalization of trade in agriculture, textiles and automobile 
manufacturing was a major focus.63 
Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA)
“The CCFTA [has been] the cornerstone of Canada’s strong and growing trade and investment 
relationship with Chile” since it came into force in 1997.64
Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement (CCRFTA)
“The Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement (CCRFTA) is a first-generation agreement that focuses 
mainly on trade in goods.”65 It has been into force since November 2002.66
The three agreements in this section of the paper (NAFTA, CCFTA, and CCRFTA) all include, with 
some differences in labeling and organization, the same provision regarding export restrictions.67
Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, neither Party may adopt or maintain any prohibition 
or restriction on the importation of any good of the other Party or on the exportation or sale for 
export of any good destined for the territory of the other Party, except in accordance with Article XI 
59 TPP Full Text, supra note 51, art. 2.24.
60 National treatment and market access for goods, at 4.
61 Id. at 5.
62 NAFTA Secretariat, North American Free Trade Agreement (2014), https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-the-Agreement/
North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA].
63 James McBride & Mohammed Aly Sergie, NAFTA’s Economic Impact, Council on Foreign Relations (last updated 4 October 2017), 
http://www.cfr.org/trade/naftas-economic-impact/p15790.
64 Government of Canada, Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (last modified 26 May 2017), http://international.gc.ca/trade-
commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/chile-chili/fta-ale/info.aspx?lang=eng [hereinafter CCFTA]. For 
the text of the agreement, see http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/
chile-chili/fta-ale/index.aspx?lang=en.
65 Government of Canada, Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement (last modified 51 February 2017), http://international.gc.ca/
trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/costa_rica/fta-ale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng 
[hereinafter CCRFTA]. For the text of the agreement, see http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/costa_rica/fta-ale/index.aspx?lang=en. 
66 Id.
67 NAFTA, supra note 62, art. 309; CCFTA, supra note 64, art. C-08; CCRFTA, supra note 65, art. III.7.
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of the GATT 1994, including its interpretative notes, and to this end Article XI of the GATT 1994 and 
its interpretative notes, or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which both Parties 
are party, are incorporated into and made a part of this Agreement.
2. The Parties understand that the GATT 1994 rights and obligations incorporated by paragraph 1 
prohibit, in any circumstances in which any other form of restriction is prohibited, export price 
requirements and, except as permitted in enforcement of countervailing and antidumping orders 
and undertakings, import price requirements.
3. In the event that a Party adopts or maintains a prohibition or restriction on the importation from 
or exportation to a non-Party of a good, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the Party from:
a. limiting or prohibiting the importation from the territory of the other Party of such good of 
that non-Party; or
b. requiring as a condition of export of such good of the Party to the territory of the other 
Party, that the good not be re-exported to the non-Party, directly or indirectly, without being 
consumed in the territory of the other Party.
4. In the event that a Party adopts or maintains a prohibition or restriction on the importation of 
a good from a non-Party, the Parties, on request of the other Party, shall consult with a view to 
avoiding undue interference with or distortion of pricing, marketing and distribution arrangements 
in the other Party.
5. Paragraphs 1 through 4 shall not apply to the measures set out in [specific cross-reference depends 
on the agreement in question].
According to Korinek and Bartos,
All three agreements incorporate GATT Articles XI and XX, but in order for a party to impose 
a quantitative export restriction justified under GATT XI:2(a), XX(g), XX(i), or XX(j), it must meet 
two conditions. First, the restriction must not reduce the proportion of total export shipments 
available to the other RTA parties relative to the total supply of the good from the party using the 
export restriction, as compared to the last 36 months. Thus, if a country wants to apply an export 
restriction, it must ensure that it can continue to supply the same share of exports to the other 
parties in the RTA. Second, the restriction cannot disrupt normal channels of supply or normal shares 
of other specific goods supplied to other RTA parties. In Canada-Chile, however, copper, Chile’s main 
export, is exempt from this Article.68
Further,
These provisions aim to protect importers from any negative impacts of export restrictions, rather 
than eliminating export restrictions as a policy option. They ensure that export restrictions do not 
negatively affect the imports of RTA members since members are obliged to continue to supply the 
same proportion of the product in question to RTA members if they impose an export restriction.69 
The approach that those agreements took “is an effective approach to disciplining their use,”70 
unlike the WTO agreements, which lack discipline. In these regional agreements, food security is 
more ensured because they restrict the application of any measures that can threaten the net-food 
importing countries.
68 Jane Korinek & Jessica Bartos, Multilateralising Regionalism: Disciplines on Export Restrictions in Regional Trade Agreements, 
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Export Restrictions in Raw Materials Trade: Facts, fallacies 
and better practices, chapter 5, at 11 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/tad/events/Chapter 5_Final.pdf.
69 Id. at 11-12.
70 Id. at 12.
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(iii) WTO-Covered Agreements
Apart from GATT and AoA, TRIPS is also relevant for food security.
TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement 
Article 27 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and 
whether products are imported or locally produced.
. . .
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
. . .
(b) Plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or 
by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this 
subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement.71
TRIPS “mandates the protection of plant varieties, allowing several options: ‘patents, an effective 
sui generis regime or a combination of both.’”72 “The patentability requirements (particularly the 
inventive step) seem not only unsuited to plant varieties but also, given the scope of rights generally 
granted under patents, may deter further research and breeding on protected materials and erode 
the rights of farmers to save and reuse seeds.”73 TRIPS could affect the food security of the importing 
countries, as the monopoly enshrined in patents relating to plant and particularly seeds could cause 
a rise in the international markets prices.
In conclusion, this paper has looked into some of the proposals that have been submitted by different 
countries in order to suggest clarification of ambiguous terms in the GATT and the AoA. Furthermore, it 
presented a numbers of treaties within and outside the WTO framework, focusing on the articles that 
are related to the export restrictions and examining and comparing the similarities and differences 
between the agreements.
Questions
To clarify the ambiguities in the existing WTO Covered Agreements, the authors propose a number of 
questions, accompanied by and referenced to the relevant GATT and AoA provisions that could help kick-
start the negotiation process and test Members’ reactions. 
1. What is the maximum duration considered under “temporarily”? [Art. XI: 2(a), GATT, 1994]. 
2. What are the criteria that constitute “critical shortage of food staff?” [Art. XI: 2(a), GATT, 1994]. 
71 World Trade Organization, Uruguay Round Agreement: TRIPS, § 5, art. 27, subdivs. (1) & (3), https://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm (last visited 21 January 2018) [hereinafter TRIPS].
72 Carlos Correa, TRIPS flexibility for patents and food security: options for developing countries, 2 Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable 




3. What is the percentage that could be considered as a reason to prevent a critical shortage of food 
staff? [Art. XI: 2(a), GATT, 1994].  
4. What is the principle that the country should rely on to prove the critical shortage? [Art. XI: 2(a), 
GATT, 1994]. 
5. What action can be taken against countries that will increase the price of the domestic materials for 
their benefit in accordance with article XX? [Art. XX: (i), GATT, 1994]. 
6. Is there a principle that a country can rely on to apply the security exceptions? [Art. XXI, GATT, 1994]. 
7. Does the importing member have the right to object to the new restriction measure instituted by the 
exporting country, if such measure will affect the food security of the importing country? [Art. 12, AOA]. 
8. Which circumstances could be considered as a breach of essential security interest? [Art. XXI, GATT, 1994]. 
9. What is the maximum duration of the action that will be taken in accordance with security interest? 
[Art. XXI, GATT, 1994]. 
10. Please provide an indicative list of the emergency situations that Members consider justifiable under 
the National Security Exception [Art. XXI, GATT, 1994]. 
Qatar proposal
Background
Qatar is a developing country and one of the smallest Gulf countries in terms of population and geographical 
area. Qatar is highly dependent on oil and gas as income resources because it has the second largest gas 
reserves in the world, representing more than 5% of the world total. The Qatar National Food Security 
Program (QNFSP) is in line with the principles of the Qatar National Vision 2030.74 QNFSP’s objective is to 
develop a sustainable food security policy for Qatar by increasing and enhancing domestic agricultural 
production and strengthening the reliability of food imports from abroad. Qatar, as a net-food importing 
country, faces many challenges when it comes to the export restriction measures governed by the WTO 
agreements. Therefore, the Qatar Proposal will focus on promoting the net-food importing countries’ 
interests and decreasing the challenges they are facing.   
The proposal: 
First, as discussed in previous sections, a number of terms in the GATT relating to food security are 
ambiguous, including “temporarily” and “critical shortage”, and thus should be clarified. Second, while 
the WTO Committee on Agriculture75 currently does not impose special mechanisms to discipline perceived 
violations, it could actively monitor and regularly publish its observations so as to incur reputational cost 
for any violations. 
With a view towards strengthening the discipline of export restrictions and the exceptions, the authors 
present some concrete proposals below. 
Transparency: 
1. Concerning the maximum duration for the term “temporarily” in GATT 1994 Article XI (2)(a), eighteen 
months should be set as the maximum duration for the application export restrictions. In addition, this 
duration should be divided into three periods of six months. Further, the member who instituted the 
measure should submit two reports to the Committee on Agriculture every six months addressing the 
progress and explaining the need for extending the duration for another six months if such an extension 
74 See General Secretariat for Development Planning, Qatar National Vision 2030 (n.d.), file:///D:/Downloads/Qatar_National_
Vision_2030.pdf (last visited 18 January 2018). 
75 See World Trade Organization, The Agriculture Committee, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_work_e.htm (last 
visited 19 January 2018).
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is necessary.  
2. Concerning the percentage that should be considered as a “critical shortage of foodstuff” in GATT 
1994 Article XI (2)(a), the percentage should be a deficiency that represents twenty-five percent of a 
member’s annual production.
3. The maximum duration and parameters of the emergency situations that qualify under the National Security 
Exception under GATT 1994 Article XXI should be specified. In particular, the Committee on Agriculture 
should issue a decision that lists emergency situations justifiable under the National Security Exception. 
4. A subcommittee within the Committee on Agriculture that will regularly look into the potential violations 
and publish the results should be created. 
5. The member applying export restrictions should submit a formal request to the Committee on Agriculture 
before the application of the measure, and set up consultations with importing members that could be 
affected by the measure, to determine the legality, scope, and duration of the measure. Additionally, 
the member must act in accordance with any agreements reached during the consultations and must 
re-negotiate the agreement if it wishes to change the terms of the initial measure. 
Transparency plus: 
1. The export tax rates should be restricted qualitatively and quantitatively, such as through tariff schedules. 
2. The obligations of developing countries, those whose export does not exceed five percent of the global 
market or fifteen percent of their national income, should be reduced.
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